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Abstract 
In cases where mothers were wrongfully convicted of killing their children, both forensic and non-
forensic evidence was admitted. Although the expert opinions and evidence were subsequently 
robustly scrutinised, the same is not true for informal evidence of maternal behaviour. The paper 
proposes that if we consider an analogous area of criminal justice which has seen interpretations of the 
feminine strongly challenged, such as in rape trials, then we might learn from rape myth scholarship 
how better to analyse child death cases. The article explores the difficult issues in rape myth 
scholarship in identifying what a rape myth is, how widely it is held, and how complex layers of 
functionality and connections constitute belief systems. By focussing on behavioural normativity and 
the deployment of fixed beliefs the article proposes a device based on the insights of rape myth 
scholarship with which to interrogate the behaviour evidence admitted in child death cases. Using the 
concept of modern mothering myths may prevent the possibility of background evidence being used 
as a vehicle for smuggling in prejudicial material of little probative value. 
 
Introduction 
When mothers stand trial for killing their children, the body of evidence presented has to be considered 
as a whole.  Given the array of its constituent parts it may be difficult to know why precisely a woman 
has been found guilty. In seeking better to understand how particular miscarriages of justice occurred, 
my research has explored a number of cases involving mothers accused of killing their children, 
including those of Sally Clark, Angela Cannings, Angela Gay and Donna Anthony.1 These cases were 
notably characterised by expert evidence and expert witnesses later shown to be unsound and 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law, Bournemouth University, UK. Email gorr@bournemouth.ac.uk  
1 Referred to here as child death cases: R v Clark (Sally)(Appeal against Conviction) (No 2) [2003] EWCA Crim 1020, 
[2003] 2 FCR 447; R v Cannings (Angela) [2004] EWCA Crim 1, [2004] 1 WLR 2607; R v Gay (Angela), R v Gay (Ian 
Anthony) [2006] EWCA Crim 820, 2006 WL 1078909; R v Donna Anthony (Appeal against Conviction) (No 2) [2005] 
EWCA Crim 952, 2005 WL 816001. 
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unreliable respectively, and inevitably the search for reasons to explain the wrongful convictions have 
concentrated on the expert evidence and its handling by the criminal justice system (CJS).2  
But, as feminist scholar Celia Wells commented, there was ‘no attempt…to ask why it was so easy to 
leap to conclusions that now seem so wrong’.3 She submitted that ‘feminist arguments’4 could help 
‘unravel these questions’.5 Fiona Raitt and research psychologist Suzanne Zeedyk further proposed 
that ‘hidden factors’6 such as ‘underlying assumptions’7 and ‘discourses of motherhood’8 may have 
‘played a major role in the initial convictions of Cannings and Clark’.9 Emma Cunliffe too suggested 
that the mechanism for achieving a mother’s (wrongful) conviction in Clark and Cannings, drew on 
discourses of motherhood within legal discourses.10 Difficulties arise from such propositions however, 
because they are sizeable claims: for example that, in the absence of conclusive expert opinion, 
advocates were forced to explain children’s deaths in Clark and Cannings by filling the evidential gaps 
using ‘social expectations’ about ‘proper mothering’;11 or that where the diagnostic techniques of child 
mistreatment are uncertain, mothers may be criminalised by deliberately portraying them as failing to 
conform to the dominant ideology of motherhood.12 Such claims are, as Laura Hoyano rightly points 
                                                 
2 Law Commission, The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales A New Approach 
to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability (Law Com Consultation Paper No 190, 2009); Law Commission, The 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 325, 2011). 
3 Wells C, ‘The Impact of Feminist Thinking on Criminal Law and Justice: Contradiction, Complexity, Conviction and 
Connection’ [2004] Crim LR 88, 99. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Raitt F and Zeedyk S, ‘Mothers on Trial: Discourses of Cot Death and Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy’ (2004) 12 
Fem LS 257, 263. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Cunliffe E, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood (Hart Publishing 2011) 37, 100, 101, referencing English criminal cases 
in her examination of the conviction of Australian Kathleen Folbigg, ‘convicted of the murder of two of her infant children, 
the manslaughter of another and of causing grievous bodily harm to, and murdering a fourth’: R v Folbigg [2003] NSWSC 
895 para 1 per Barr J; R v Folbigg [2005] NSWCCA 23. 
11 Raitt and Zeedyk (n 6) 264. 
12 Cunliffe (n 10) 100 citing Klein M, ‘Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nation 
Women’ in MA Fineman and I Karpin (eds) Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood 
(Colombia UP 1995) and Roberts DE, ‘Motherhood and Crime’ (1993) 79 Iowa L Rev. 
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out, ‘very large and diffuse’.13 It is possible, that the difficulties arise because ‘hidden factors’,14 
‘underlying assumptions’15 and ‘discourses of mothering’16 are as yet insufficiently defined and 
require further analysis in order to clarify how they are deployed by agents of the CJS in portraying 
maternal behaviour.  
As both Hunter17 and Redmayne18 suggest a technically complex evidential context may hide the true 
operation of informal background or character evidence in practice19 and in examining the wrongful 
conviction cases, it is evident that informal non-medical20 and non-forensic material21 such as maternal 
behaviour and childcare22 was freely admitted to these trials. When further child death cases were 
examined where female childminders and baby-sitters were convicted,23 where mothers remain 
incarcerated,24 and where mothers were acquitted25 or their conviction was reduced from murder to 
                                                 
13 Hoyano L, ‘Book Review, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood’ (2014) 18(2) Evid & Proof 200, 202. 
14 Raitt and Zeedyk (n 6) 263. 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid. 
17 Hunter J, ‘Publication Review: Character Evidence in the Criminal Trial’ (2016) Evid & Proof 162, 163, in relation to 
evidence of character as ‘background evidence’. 
18 Redmayne M, Character in the Criminal Trial (OUP 2015). 
19 Hunter (n 17) 166. See her suggestion ‘that a complex evidentiary and advocacy landscape often hid from law reports 
the full operation of character evidence in practice’. 
20 Non-medical evidence may be defined in a number of ways, but is used here to refer to information that is not presented 
by an expert, nor based on research, whether scientific or medical. In the context of the cases examined in this paper, the 
information includes maternal behaviour, child care, internet search history, diary entries, and sexual, personal, social and 
health records and history. The term non-medical is used instead of non-expert in order to avoid confusion, as the latter 
term is often used to describe evidence purporting to be specialist and its author an expert, but the courts have decided 
following rigorous scrutiny, that neither the evidence nor the presenter is expert. See Ward T, ‘“A New and More Rigorous 
Approach” To Expert Evidence In England And Wales’ (2015) 19(4) Intl J  Evid & Proof 228; Pattenden R, ‘Conflicting 
Approaches to Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: England, Canada and Australia’ (1986)  Crim L Rev 92; Pattenden 
R, ‘The Proof Rules of Pre-Verdict Judicial Fact-Finding In Criminal Trials By Jury’ (2009) 125 LQR 79; Redmayne (n 
18). 
21 Mike Redmayne also employs the term ‘non-criminal bad character’ (n 18) 77-86. 
22 Both past behaviours and behaviours concurrent with the child’s death are admitted; for example whether the mother: 
commenced immediate resuscitation, called the ambulance, used an apnoea monitor consistently, forgot in which cot a 
baby died, had an addiction or dependency, or reacted to the death hysterically or over emotionally, or in an ‘attention 
seeking’ way. Other indicators that may be found are mothers who: were inexperienced, had unrealistic expectations of 
their baby, found it difficult to bond, gave the child to someone else to care for, disliked being home alone, went back to 
work, felt resentful if their partner was away from home, had had a previous cot death, had a dirty home, was vulnerable, 
or had been abused as a child. 
23 R v Stacey (Helen Brenda) [2001] EWCA Crim 2031, 2001 WL 1135255; R v Holdsworth (Suzanne) [2008] EWCA 
Crim 971, 2008 WL 1867253; R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269, [2010] 2 Cr App R 24. 
24 R v Kai-Whitewind (Chaha'oh Niyol) [2005] EWCA Crim 1092, [2005] 2 Cr App R 31; R v Folbigg [2003] NSWSC 
895, R v Folbigg [2005] NSWCCA 23. 
25 R v Patel (Trupti) (Reading Crown Court, 11 June 2003); LB of Islington v Al-Alas and Wray [2012] EWHC 865 (Fam); 
R v Khatun (Saleha) (Central Criminal Court, 22 December 2009); R v Haigh (Tara Elizabeth [2010] EWCA Crim 90, 
2010 WL 308548 CACD; Hainey v HM Advocate No 7 [2013] HCJAC 47, [2013] SLT 525, [2014] JC 33; R v Smith 
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manslaughter,26 information about maternal behaviour and childcare was admitted in all cases apart 
from two.27 Consequently, it appears that information about a woman’s behaviour is normatively 
admitted where women are accused of killing their children. The presence of such material as part of 
a body of evidence that includes highly complex, contested and controversial expert opinion, supports 
the concerns raised by feminist commentators that portrayals of maternal behaviour may have 
influenced trial outcomes.28 Thus, in particular miscarriages of justice, not only may overzealous 
expert opinions and flawed scientific information bolster the prospect of injustice, but interpretations 
of the feminine also. 
Prima facie, admission of non-medical and non-forensic behaviour information at trial seems sensible. 
At the law-science interface however, jurors face unenviable decision making responsibilities based 
on contested, controversial or scant expert opinions. In such situations, behaviour evidence may 
become more significant as jurors may be tempted to rely on fixed beliefs.29 If such material is then 
stereotypically30 or even prejudicially31 interpreted, then constructions, assumptions and expectations 
of the feminine may contribute to unsafe convictions.  
In contrast to the exhaustive investigations into the use of expert opinion and scientific evidence in 
criminal prosecutions,32 scant attention has been paid in the literature to the impact on criminal 
proceedings of admitting evidence of maternal behaviour and child care in cases where mothers are 
accused of killing their children. Nor is there robust research demonstrating that past female or 
                                                 
(Margaret) (Newcastle Crown Court, 10 November 2004); R v Underdown (Nicky) [2001] EWCA Crim 1556, 2001 WL 
753325; Walker (Jennifer) v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 51, [2011] SLT 1114. 
26 R v Harris (Lorraine) [2005] EWCA Crim 1980, [2006] 1 Cr App R 5. 
27 Underdown (n 25) and Walker (n 25). In Walker the wrongful conviction was based upon the lack of proper judicial 
directions on expert evidence and in Underdown the defence offered no argument even though expert opinion for the 
prosecution was significantly flawed.  
28 Wells (n 3); Raitt and Zeedyk (n 6); Cunliffe (n 10). 
29 Hunter (n 17) 170.  
30 Stereotype is defined as ‘a widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing 
e.g. the stereotype of the woman as the carer’: Oxford Dictionaries http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ 
(accessed 19 May 2016). 
31 Prejudicial is defined as ‘harmful or detrimental to someone or something’: ibid. 
32 Law Commission No 325 (n 2) paras. 1.8, 1.17, 1.18, 1.21, 2.16, 3.3, 3.4.  
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maternal behaviours and actions before and around the time a child dies lead to reliable inferences. 
Consequently, it is possible that evidence of maternal behaviour generally discounted as holding 
merely informal, peripheral or contextual value may be influential when admitted into criminal 
proceedings and may need to be considered more carefully in relation to its use or even its 
admissibility.   
In order to explore whether and how evidence of maternal behaviour might influence trial outcomes, 
a comparable situation within the criminal justice system in which information about women’s conduct 
and personal history is admitted as informal background evidence has been sought. Two key topic 
areas were identified: the first when abused women have killed their husbands,33 and the second when 
women are claimants in rape cases.34 In each area feminist scholarship and judicial commentary 
indicates that adverse interpretations of female behaviour may occur at trial and may influence 
outcomes.35 Significantly, rape myth scholars have argued that the use of stereotypical assumptions 
and/or the device of rape myths to interpret evidence of female behaviour, results in damaging 
                                                 
33 Childs M and Ellison L (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Evidence (Routledge Cavendish 2000) 16; R. v. Lavallee [1990] 
1 SCR 852; Sanghvi R and Nicholson D, ‘Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of R v Ahluwalia’ (1993) 
Crim L Rev 728; Herring J, Criminal Law (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 302; R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889; R v Thornton 
(No 1) [1992] 1 All ER 306; R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023; R v Dhaliwal [2006] EWCA Crim 1139, [2006] 
2 Cr App R 24. 
34 Childs and Ellison, ibid., 11; Ellison L and McGlynn C, ‘Commentary on R v A (No 2)’ in R Hunter, C McGlynn and E 
Rackley (eds) Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing 2010) 205; Easton S, ‘The Use of Sexual 
History Evidence in Rape Trials’ in M Childs and L Ellison (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Evidence (Routledge Cavendish 
2000) 167; R v Seaboyer (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 193; R v D [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, Times 26 November 2008; R v H 
[1997] 1 Cr App R 176, 177-178 per Sedley J: ‘It has become standard practice for defence lawyers in rape…cases to seek 
to compel the production of any social services, education, psychiatric, medical or similar records concerning the 
complainant, in the hope that these will furnish material for cross-examination’. See also concerns raised in M v Director 
of Legal Aid Casework [2014] EWHC 1354 (Admin), [2014] ACD 124. 
35 For example, Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in R v Seboyer [1991] 2 SCR 577 paras 140-152 and 207: ‘Whatever 
the test, be it one of experience, common sense or logic, it is a decision particularly vulnerable to the application of private 
beliefs. Regardless of the definition used, the content of any relevancy decision will be filled by the particular judge’s 
experience, common sense and/or logic. For the most part there will be general agreement as to that which is relevant, and 
the determination will not be problematic. However, there are certain areas of inquiry where experience, common sense 
and logic are informed by stereotype and myth. As I have made clear, this area of the law has been particularly prone to 
the utilization of stereotype in determinations of relevance and, again, as was demonstrated earlier, this appears to be the 
unfortunate concomitant of a society which, to a large measure, holds these beliefs. It would also appear that recognition 
of the large role that stereotype may play in such determinations has had surprisingly little impact in this area of the law’. 
And at para 140: ‘Of tantamount importance in answering the constitutional questions in this case is a consideration of the 
prevalence and impact of discriminatory beliefs on trials of sexual offences. These beliefs affect the processing of 
complaints, the law applied when and if the case proceeds to trial, the trial itself and the ultimate verdict’. 
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inferences and adverse outcomes in criminal proceedings.36 For reasons of space only one area can be 
considered here,  although both are considered  at length elsewhere.37 
Rape myth scholarship (RMS) has therefore been explored to learn whether using the rape myth as an 
analogous device to analyse cases, perhaps by identifying mothering myths, may be helpful where 
mothers are accused of killing their children. Although several cases have been analysed, for reasons 
of space two key cases are used as illustrations, and the following brief overview shows how 
foregrounded expert evidence may be interwoven with informal background behaviour evidence.   
Sally Clark 
Following the consecutive deaths of Sally Clark’s  first two infants, Christopher and Harry, suspicions 
were raised and she was later found guilty of murdering both.38 Her first appeal, dismissed by Henry 
LJ,39 was followed by a second successful appeal granted by Kay LJ.40 At trial, the prosecution, using 
flawed statistical41 and later discredited medical opinion,42 had argued that Clark had smothered her 
sons to death. The successful appeal relied on fresh evidence in the form of microbiology test results 
                                                 
36 Temkin J and Krahé B in Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Hart Publishing 2008) 31 theorise 
that the justice gap identified in sexual offending statistics – i.e. the discrepancy between the rapidly rising number of 
recorded rapes and the relatively static number of convictions – may be explained by such beliefs. See Crown Prosecution 
Service, Narrowing the Justice Gap (2014) http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/justicegap.html  (accessed 2 
June 2016). 
37 Orr G, Mothering Myths, Child Deaths and the Law (Routledge forthcoming 2020). 
38 R v Clark (Sally) (Chester Crown Court, 9 November 1999). 
39 R v Clark (Sally) (Appeal against Conviction) (No 1) 2000 WL 1421196. 
40 Clark (No 2) (n 1). 
41 Ibid paras 96, 99 per Kay LJ. At trial expert witness Professor Meadow was quoted as saying the odds of two infants 
dying from natural causes in one family were 1 in 73 million and those odds he suggested, were equivalent to placing a bet 
on a horse at the Grand National at odds of 80 to 1 for four consecutive years and winning. ‘Yes, you have to multiply 1 
in 8,543 times 1 in 8,543 and I think it gives that in the penultimate paragraph’, referring to Fleming P, Blair P, Bacon C, 
et al., Sudden Unexpected Deaths in Infancy: The CESDI SUDI Studies 1993-1996 (TSO 2000) 92 Table 3.58, and referred 
to in Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 131 per Henry LJ. 
42 Meadow R, The ABC of Child Abuse (3rd edn., BMJ Publishing Group 1997) 29: ‘one sudden infant death is a tragedy, 
two is suspicious and three is murder, unless proven otherwise’. This opinion represented as a ‘law’ was based upon the 
opinion expressed in Di Maio DJ and Di Maio VJM, Forensic Pathology (Elsevier 1989) 291: ‘It is the authors’ opinion 
that while a second SIDS death…is improbable, it is possible and she should be given the benefit of the doubt. A third 
case, in our opinion, is not possible and is a case of homicide’. 
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not disclosed at trial indicating that a cerebro-spinal fluid infection may have been the cause of Harry’s 
death.   
The way Clark’s behaviour was portrayed at trial is noteworthy. Despite being described positively  as 
a ‘normal, happy, caring mother’,43 she was also characterised as a woman who resented being left 
alone and, who ‘tended to drink more heavily when her husband was away’.44 Such representations 
may have been true, but were also prejudicial to Clark’s credibility because of the way in which 
mothers dependent on alcohol may be judged.45 At trial and at first appeal Clark’s alcohol dependency 
was given greater evidential weight than in the second appeal judgment. Clark indicates that it is not 
only medical opinions that may bear contrary interpretations at different stages within a child death 
case, but evidence of maternal behaviour may at first instance and first appeal be perceived as highly 
relevant but, at a later appeal, may be considered of no probative value.  
Angela Cannings 
The way Sally Clark’s behaviour was portrayed, and possibly perceived,  was echoed in Cannings. 
Cannings had four children, three of whom died suddenly in infancy.46 Tried for the murder of two of 
her children by smothering, the prosecution used circumstantial evidence and medical opinion to argue 
that Cannings had murdered two of her three children. She was convicted, but acquitted two years later 
because medical opinion suggesting that the rarity of three infant deaths in one family was evidence 
of murder,47 was unsafe.48 In addition to medical opinion the appeal report records information about 
maternal behaviour and childcare. For example, ‘There was no suggestion of ill-temper, inappropriate 
behaviour, ill-treatment, let alone violence, at any time with any one of the four children’.49 Her 
                                                 
43 Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 17 per Henry LJ. 
44 Ibid para 87. 
45 Cave E, The Mother of All Crimes: Human Rights, Criminalisation and the Child Born Alive (Ashgate 2004). 
46 Cannings (n 1); and also see Donna Anthony, convicted of two counts of murder in R v Anthony (Donna) (Bristol Crown 
Court, 17 November 1998) by smothering her two babies on the basis of similar medical opinions to those presented in 
Clark and Cannings, and acquitted at her second appeal on similar grounds: Anthony (No 2) (n 1). 
47 Meadow (n 42). 
48 Cannings (n 1) para 165 per Judge LJ. 
49 Ibid para 160. 
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behaviour as a mother was apparently exemplary; Cannings was depicted as a ‘woman of good 
character, described as a loving mother’.50 Health visitors reported that she and her husband had always 
cared for their children properly,51 and that Cannings had bonded with her daughter Jade, who ‘seemed 
to be a well-cared for and loved baby’.52  
Her children had unexplained health difficulties, however, and at trial, prosecution counsel suggested 
that Cannings had smothered one of her sons ‘in an attempt to evoke sympathy’.53 By suggesting that 
Cannings was mentally ill, prosecution counsel may have sought to reduce her credibility by alluding 
to the syndrome Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSbP)54 and suggesting that at the very least, 
Cannings had something wrong with her as an attention-seeking mother. Once fresh medical opinion 
was accepted that three sudden infant deaths in one family could occur naturally,55 prosecution 
arguments included in the judicial summing up56 seeking to syndromise or portray Cannings as a 
mentally ill mother, were no longer relevant.  
The two brief case summaries show that both worthy and questionable maternal behaviour may be 
admitted and such information is unlikely to be ruled inadmissible unless there is a ‘risk of jury 
irrationality’.57 Overall, the courts’ approach is to place as much relevant, or ‘more or less relevant’58 
                                                 
50 Ibid para 4. 
51 Ibid para 66. 
52 Ibid para 94. 
53 Ibid para 59.   
54 Munchausen Syndrome ‘is a psychological and behavioural condition where someone pretends to be ill or induces 
symptoms of illness in themselves. It is also sometimes known as factitious disorder. People with the condition intentionally 
produce or pretend to have physical or psychological symptoms of illness. Their main intention is to assume the “sick role” 
to have people care for them and be the centre of attention. Any practical benefit for them in pretending to be sick – for 
example, claiming incapacity benefit – is not the reason for their behaviour. From the available case studies, there appear 
to be two relatively distinct groups of people affected by Munchausen's Syndrome: women aged 20 to 40 years old, who 
often have a background in healthcare, such as working as a nurse or a medical technician’ see UK NHS website 
http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/munchausens-syndrome/Pages/Introduction.aspx (accessed 2 August 2015). MSbP is a 
condition where the person pretends that someone else (typically their child) is ill or induces symptoms of illness in the 
child. 
55 Cannings (n 1) para 148 per Judge LJ. 
56 Ibid para 5. 
57 Pattenden R, ‘Authenticating “Things” in English Law: Principles For Adducing Tangible Evidence in Common Law 
Jury Trials’ (2008) 12 Intl J Evid & Proof, 273, 279 
58 Tapper C, Cross and Tapper on Evidence (OUP 2010) 65 and explanatory notes at n 686-687. 
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information before a jury, and to rely on judicial directions,59 together with ‘judicial warnings and 
common sense to ensure that it is properly evaluated’.60 The admission of informal, extraneous female 
behaviour evidence has long been a feature of sexual assault and rape prosecutions.61 The relevance 
of certain behaviours such as previous sexual history have been strongly challenged by rape myth 
scholars to the extent that this material may now not be admitted without leave.62 Nevertheless, other 
types of claimant information may be sought by defence teams such as medical, mental health and 
social welfare records,63 archived internet searches64 and more recently mobile phone content65 and 
social media66 with text and image content.67  
For women accused of killing the children in their care therefore, any past behaviour information 
including internet searches, medical and mental health or social welfare reports and counselling 
records may be freely admissible. Such a position echoes that of rape complainants for whom feminist 
                                                 
59 See e.g. Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Crown Court Compendium Part I: Jury and Trial Management and Summing 
Up (Judicial College 2016) https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/crown-court-bench-book-directing-the- jury-2/ 
(accessed 1 September 2016). 
60 Pattenden R, and Ashworth A, ‘Reliability, Hearsay Evidence and the English Criminal Trial’ [1986] LQR 292, 296. 
61 Roberts P and Zuckerman A, Criminal Evidence (2nd edn, OUP 2010) 109, 115-125, 581. 
62 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s 4: ‘Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual 
history. (1)  If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence, then, except with the leave of the court—(a)  no evidence 
may be adduced, and (b)  no question may be asked in cross-examination, by or on behalf of any accused at the trial, about 
any sexual behaviour of the complainant’. 
63 But see s 278 of the Canadian Criminal Code (CCC) regulating disclosure of personal records in sexual offence trials. 
In s 278, a ‘record’ is defined as ‘any form of record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy’. 
64 Ramage S, ‘Case Comment: R. v Kular (Rosdeep Adekoya)’ (HCJ 25 August 2014) (2014) Crim Law 2. Rosdeep Kular 
was convicted for the culpable homicide of her young son following the identification of internet searches suggesting 
motive. She had typed into search engines, ‘Why am I so aggressive to my son?’, and ‘I find it hard to love my son’. See 
also Brooks L, ‘Rosdeep Adekoya jailed for 11 years for killing her son Mikaeel Kular’, The Guardian (London, 25 August 
2014) http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/aug/25/rosdeep-adekoya-jailed-11-years-killing-son-mikaeel-kular  
(accessed 4 November 2014). 
65 Owen Bowcott, ‘Victims’ Commissioner sparks row over rape case phone searches’, The Guardian (London, 24 July 
2019) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jul/24/dame-vera-baird-sparks-row-over-case-police-phone-
searches?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other (accessed 25 July 2019); Opinion, ‘My sexual assault case was dropped because I 
wouldn’t hand over my phone’, The Guardian (London, 31 July 2019) 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/31/sexual-assault-case-dropped-phone-
traumatic?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other (accessed 31 July 2019).  
66 O’Floinn M and Ormerod D, ‘The Use of Social Networking Sites In Criminal Investigations’ (2011) 10 Crim LR 766, 
citing (at n 10) Warren G, ‘Interactive Online Services, Social Networking Sites and the Protection of Children’ (2008) 
Ent L Rev 165, referring to evidence ‘such as search, email, messaging, chat, blogs, gaming, discussion forums, VoIP 
[Voice over Internet Protocol e.g. Skype], photos, music and videos’. 
67 Owen Bowcott, ‘Police demands for access to rape victims’ phones “unlawful”’, The Guardian (London, 23 July 2019) 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/jul/23/police-demands-for-access-to-victims-phones-unlawful (accessed 25 July 
2019).  
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and legal commentary have identified the dangers of a permissive approach to the admission of 
behaviour evidence, because some female behaviours68 may be readily misinterpreted as rape myths.  
The following section will examine how a rape myth has come to be conceptualised in RMS and how 
this concept may be used in understanding what may have been happening in rape trials. RMS has 
studied the admission of evidence of female behaviours and sought to show how the rape myth device 
works in calling out prejudicial and stereotypical beliefs. By analogy, this paper suggests that in cases 
of women accused of killing their children, damaging but unfounded inferences may be drawn from 
maternal behaviour admitted at trial, and proposes that a similar device, the mothering myth, may help 
in identifying unfounded and prejudicial beliefs about mothers.  
There are some methodological difficulties to consider. First, the totality of RMS cannot be represented 
here and so only key developments in the search for definition are examined. Secondly, the analogy 
between rape trials and child death cases is complicated by the fact that in rape trials the woman is the 
complainant and in child death cases she is the defendant; in rape trials the woman has alleged that the 
defendant should be convicted while in child death cases the mother as defendant seeks to be acquitted. 
The divergences in adversarial attitude and carceral intention are put to one side in this paper, to focus 
on how rape myth scholars have approached the issue of defining a rape myth, and how their work 
might enable us better to analyse child death cases.   
 
Rape Myth Scholarship 
The issues raised by unjust interpretations of female rape complainants’ behaviour are considerable 
and RMS has challenged the relevance of and constructions of behaviour evidence in rape and sexual 
                                                 
68 For example: dress, demeanour and failure to immediately report the assault.   
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assault trials relating to sexual history,69 dress, alcohol and drug use, time of reporting,70 and more 
recently, personal records.71 Complainant behaviours have been subject to interpretation using 
normative expectations about women’s behaviour and the circumstances of alleged rape, in order to 
reach conclusions on issues of claimant consent and credibility.72 Unjust acquittals have been argued 
to have occurred because a complainant’s credibility has been unfairly devalued as a result of the 
admission of information about her conduct, and its adverse interpretation.73 Ellison has suggested that 
the admission of information about the complainant’s behaviour has been a function of masculine 
judicial perspectives on questions of relevance,74 which may ‘at best, risk…the undervaluing of 
women’s experience and interests’.75 The consequence is, as Temkin and Krahé have argued, that 
unjust acquittals create a justice gap in the CJS generated by rape myths.76 But, to prove that rape 
complaint attrition and unjust acquittals in rape trials are due to myths – ‘widely held but false beliefs 
or ideas’77 – has been problematical. It is likely that the same may hold true if without more, we were 
to say that wrongful convictions in child death cases were caused by hidden factors, underlying 
assumptions, discourses of mothering or even mothering myths.  
 
Issues in definition, linkage and functionality of ideas about rape.  
The definitional difficulties encountered in RMS have been considerable; they include determining 
                                                 
69 Easton (n 34); R v Seaboyer (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 193. 
70 R v D [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, Times, 26 November 2008. 
71 H [1997] 1 Cr App R 176, 177-178 per Sedley J: ‘It has become standard practice for defence lawyers in rape…cases to 
seek to compel the production of any social services, education, psychiatric, medical or similar records concerning the 
complainant, in the hope that these will furnish material for cross-examination’. See also concerns raised in M v Director 
of Legal Aid Casework [2014] EWHC 1354 (Admin), [2014] ACD 124.  
72 Childs and Ellison (n 33) 211, 213, 219. 
73 Ibid 11, citing (at n 34) Adler Z, ‘The Relevance of Sexual History Evidence in Rape: Problems of Subjective 
Interpretation’ [1985] Crim LR 769; McColgan A, ‘Common Law and the Relevance of Sexual History Evidence’ [1996] 
OJLS 275. 
74 Ellison and McGlynn (n 34) 205, 206-207, citing (at n 7) Kinports K, ‘Evidence Engendered’ (1991) 2 U Illinois L Rev 
413, 431.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Temkin and Krahé (n 36) 165, 172-175.   
77 Oxford Dictionaries, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/myth (accessed 19 May 2016). 
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functionality,78 achieving agreement on who believes rape myths79 and how many people accept them; 
whether they function as feared, i.e. leading to adverse decision making; and if they even exist.80  Burt 
first coined the  term rape myths to describe ‘prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape 
victims and rapists’.81 These beliefs included: ‘“only bad girls get raped”; “any healthy woman can 
resist a rapist if she really wants to”; “women ask for it”; “women ‘cry rape’ only when they've been 
jilted or have something to cover up”; “rapists are sex-starved, insane, or both”’.82 Burt identified that 
such beliefs were linked to beliefs justifying sexual violence.83 In seeking to define rape myths, Burt 
conducted a regression analysis of interview data to question whether ‘settled ways of thinking or 
feeling’ about rape or rape attitudes, were ‘strongly connected to other deeply held and pervasive 
viewpoints such as sex role stereotyping, distrust of the opposite sex (adversarial sexual beliefs), and 
acceptance of interpersonal violence’.84 Burt’s pioneering work in developing Rape Myth Acceptance 
(RMA) scales demonstrated the broad extent to which such beliefs were held and that they fulfilled 
cultural functions by endorsing other gendered ideas.  
Building on Burt’s foundational work, Lonsway and Fitzgerald reviewed the literature and also found 
difficulty in clearly defining rape myths, because of belief interconnections and unexpected 
                                                 
78 Burt MR, ‘Cultural Myths and Supports of Rape’ (1980) 38 J Pers Soc Psychol 217; Burt MR, ‘Rape Myths and 
Acquaintance Rape’ in A Parrot and L Bechhofer (eds) Acquaintance Rape: The Hidden Crime (Wiley 1991); Costin F, 
‘Beliefs about Rape and Women’s Social Roles’ (1985) 14 Arch Sex Behav 319; Lonsway KA and Fitzgerald LF, ‘Rape 
Myths: In Review’ (1994) 18 Psychol Women 133; Gerger H, Kley H, Bohner G and Siebler F, ‘The Acceptance of Modern 
Myths about Sexual Aggression Scale: Development and Validations in German and English’ (2007) 33 Aggressive Behav 
422. 
79 Gerger et al., ibid. 
80 Reece H, ‘Rape Myths: Is Elite Opinion Right and Popular Opinion Wrong?’ (2013) 33(3) OJLS 445. 
81 Burt ‘Cultural Myths’ (n 78). 
82 Ibid. 
83 See in particular Lonsway and Fitzgerald (n 78); Gerger et al. (n 78); for example: ‘Women often make up rape 
accusations as a way of getting back at men’; ‘women cry rape only when they’ve been jilted or have something to cover 
up’; ‘a woman who initiates a sexual encounter will probably have sex with anybody’; ‘a woman shouldn't give in sexually 
to a man too easily or he'll think she's loose’; ‘men have a biologically stronger sex drive than women’; ‘a woman who 
goes to the home or apartment of a man on their first date implies that she is willing to have sex’; ‘it isn’t a rape unless he 
has a weapon’; ‘one reason that women falsely report a rape is that they frequently have a need to call attention to 
themselves’; ‘women often provoke rape through their appearance or behaviour’; ‘men often can’t control their sexual 
urges’. 
84 Burt, ‘Cultural Myths’ (n 78) 229. 
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functionality for those making decisions in criminal trials.85 RMA they found, had at its core gender, 
traditional sex role attitudes, negative attitudes towards women, and a likelihood of raping.86 They 
concluded, that ‘Such a configuration conveys a powerful message about how RMA relates to other 
beliefs about women in our society’.87 Lonsway and Fitzgerald proposed that rape myths could be 
characterised as ‘false or apocryphal beliefs that are widely held’; they explain some important cultural 
phenomenon; and they serve to justify existing cultural arrangements’.88 Nevertheless, because of the 
identification of the interrelatedness with sexist attitudes, defining a rape myth was difficult because 
of the ‘lack of any comprehensive articulation of the domain of rape myths’.89 Questionnaire scales 
seeking to measure RMA were, Lonsway and Fitzgerald suggested, unreliable because different 
studies had used different scales of questions to identify acceptance (or not) of particular beliefs.90 
Lonsway and Fitzgerald sought to take into account the arguments for interconnectedness and 
functionality, proposing that ‘Rape myths are attitudes and beliefs that are generally false but are 
widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression against 
women’.91 Their findings echo Burt’s in that rape myths could be expressed as rape supportive 
beliefs.92  
Gerger et al. drew on the insights of previous studies in a later review of RMA literature seeking to  
define beliefs as rape myths and to measure RMA.93 Despite agreement with the general usefulness of 
an RMA measurement or construct, this study concurred with Lonsway and Fitzgerald that most scales 
produced skewed results as a result of methodological approaches.94  Gerger et al. developed a new 
questionnaire they denoted the Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression scale 
                                                 
85 Lonsway and Fitzgerald (n 78) 134, 156, 158. 
86 Ibid 134, 156, 158. 
87 Ibid 155. 
88 Ibid 134. 
89 Ibid 156. 
90 Ibid 155-158. 
91 Ibid 134. 
92 Ibid. Lonsway and Fitzgerald also suggested that rape myths were ‘best conceptualised as stereotypes’ and not as myths. 
93Gerger et al. (n 78) 423.  
94 Ibid 424. 
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(AMMSA).95 The reasoning behind the creation of AMMSA was to take account of more recent 
research for example by Swim et al. into modern sexism and racism,96 which argued for a greater 
degree of subtlety about scale question content areas.97 This they suggested was because of widespread 
and institutional denials that discrimination against women, their needs and demands still occurred.98 
Gerger et al. concluded that the AMMSA scale incorporating more nuanced versions or modern myths, 
was found to be both reliable and consistent.99 But they noted that their own studies were also limited 
by sampling methodologies.100  
When rape myth functionality was explored by Gerger et al., they concurred with Burt’s work on 
cultural functionality101 that RMA may have meaning for both women as well as men, whereby RMA 
‘allows women to reduce their subjective vulnerability to sexual assault and protect their self-
esteem’.102 So, some women believe that if they do not dress revealingly in public and do not go out 
alone late at night they will not be assaulted. That of course is a false belief, but functionally the belief 
serves a purpose in (wrongly) allaying female fears103 and providing a platform for some to judge 
others, and is therefore a rape myth.   
                                                 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid 424-425, citing Swim JK, Aikin KJ, Hall WS and Hunter BA, ‘Sexism And Racism: Oldfashioned and Modern 
Prejudice’ (1995) 68 J Pers Soc Psychol 199. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. ‘Whereas ‘‘old-fashioned’’ sexism was characterized by the endorsement of traditional gender roles, discriminating 
treatment of women, and stereotypes about lesser female competence, Swim and her colleagues suggested that modern 
sexism, like modern racism, was characterized by the denial of continued discrimination, antagonism toward women’s 
demands, and a lack of support for policies designed to help women’. It is of course also debateable whether in 2020, 
modern sexism and racism are now not more overt than they were in the 1990s.  
99 Gerger et al. (n 78) 434. 
100 Ibid 436. 
101 Burt, ‘Cultural Myths’ (n 78) 229. 
102 Gerger et al. (n 78) 423-424. 
103 See, e.g., ‘I was raped as a student - and I’m not the only one’ (BBC News, 6 March 2018) 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-43258170 (accessed 25 July 2019). Hannah Price said of her sexual assault 
experience, that ‘I don't remember being taught about consent at school, other than “No means no”. What I do remember 
is being told not to walk home on my own, or I’d risk being raped by a stranger in a dark alley. But when I was raped it 
was not in the street, but in my own student house, and I had taken the precaution of being walked home by someone I 
knew’. 
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Controversially however, arguments for the existence of rape myths have been considered to be 
overstated104 as an explanation for the ‘justice gap’ in rape cases.105 Reece in particular criticised 
Gerger et al.’s work by arguing that ‘some attitudes are not myths…not all the myths are about rape 
and there is little evidence that the rape myths are widespread’.106  Her paper and later public lecture 
questioning the existence and nature of rape myths and how they are identified and measured prompted 
heated debate.107 I cannot do justice here either to Reece or her critics. My point is that the progress of 
RMS in seeking to demonstrate that particular beliefs are myths is not straightforward. RMA or 
AMMSA may be demonstrable to some extent but beliefs may change in content, become more 
nuanced, be connected with other gendered ideas and be functional for some, and true for others.108 
It is also possible that the difficulties encountered are caused by the language we use to define the 
beliefs that many find so wrong and that the word myth itself creates problems. RMS has more recently 
adopted the word attitude, ‘a settled way of thinking or feeling about something’,109 as in: ‘rape 
supportive attitudes’.110 The word is acquiring greater purchase perhaps because it is less hostile than 
the word myth can be. Indeed Burt suggested rape supportive attitudes were connected to other 
gendered and questionable attitudes,111 as did Lonsway and Fitzgerald.112 Temkin and Krahé suggest 
the issues of the justice gap relate to a ‘question of attitude’,113 and Gerger et al. also measured attitudes 
towards rape using the AMMSA scale, and found positive correlations with ‘pervasive cultural 
attitudes related to gender and violence as well as sexual harassment’.114 Reece too echoes Burt that 
                                                 
104 Reece (n 80) 446. 
105 Temkin and Krahé (n 36). 
106 Reece (n 80) 446. 
107 See, e.g., Editorial, ‘A Response to the LSE Event “Is Rape Different?”’ (2013) 3(2) feminists@law, responding to LSE 
Debating Law Inaugural Event, ‘Is Rape Different?’ (30 October 2013); Reece H, ‘Debating Rape Myths’ (2014) LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Paper Series 21/2014, at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60566/?from_serp=1 (accessed 13 
September 2018). 
108 Gerger et al. (n 78) 424. 
109 Oxford Dictionaries http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/attitude (accessed 19 May 2016). 
110 Reece (n 80) 446. 
111 Burt, ‘Cultural Myths’ (n 78) 229. 
112 Lonsway and Fitzgerald (n 78). 
113 Temkin and Krahé (n 36). 
114 Gerger et al. (n 78) 428, 435. 
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rape myths are rape supportive attitudes,115 but again she questions whether ‘public attitudes …  
deserve to be described as “rape supportive attitudes”, or warrant the label of “rape myths”’.116 For 
Reece, RMS indicates that rape supportive attitudes may not be widespread, so therefore they are not 
myths. In addition, some attitudes are not proven to be false so again, they are not myths, and some 
‘rape supportive attitudes’ are not about rape. Reece therefore suggests the possibility that scholars are 
creating myths about myths,117 and further that Gerger et al.’s work was about ‘designing a scale to 
catch people (out)’,118 and to show how awful people’s attitudes are.119  
Conaghan and Russell have strongly defended the work of Gerger et al., critiquing the arguments put 
forward by Reece and asserting that the AAMSA is ‘regarded as the most advanced measure of rape 
myth acceptance to date’.120 Far from seeking to ‘catch people (out)’121 Gerger et al. sought to 
demonstrate that prejudicial views were just more subtly held than previous RMA scales had identified, 
and that some beliefs about rape were simply ‘immune against empirical falsification’.122 For example, 
‘Many women secretly desire to be raped’123 cannot be proved or disproved and therefore showing 
that such a belief is a myth, is difficult if not impossible.124 Gerger et al. had suggested that rape myths 
should not be defined in terms of being false, but ‘“wrong” in an ethical sense’,125 acknowledging the 
possibility that some rape myths may be true for some people. But, even if  ‘the factual configurations 
comprising rape myths may on occasion be true’ as Conaghan and Russell accept,126 RMS has become 
                                                 
115 Reece (n 80) 446. 
116 Ibid 453. 
117 Ibid 446. 
118 Ibid 454-455. 
119 Ibid. However, this criticism seems unbalanced in failing to recognise that the accurate identification of so-called RMA 
or rape supportive attitudes, has a great deal to do with statistical analysis, study design and sampling methodology. In 
order to understand what is the nature and prevalence of rape supportive attitudes, it is vital to unpick the results and 
methodology of studies that demonstrate only politically supportive results.   
120 Conaghan J and Russell Y, ‘Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: “Myths About Myths”?’ (2014) 22 Fem Leg 
Studs 24, 35. 
121 Reece (n 80) 454-455. 
122 Gerger et al. (n 78) 423. 
123 Ibid, citing Lonsway and Fitzgerald (n 78). 
124 Gerger et al, ibid. 
125Ibid. 
126 Conaghan and Russell (n 120) 26. 
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more concerned with addressing ideas ‘treated as generalizable truths which function normatively to 
shape perceptions and inform judgment’.127  
Consequently, what RMS shows us is that there are challenges in defining beliefs about female 
behaviours in relation to sexual assault and rape as myths. Using either RMA or AMMSA is 
methodologically problematic. It is difficult to say or reveal exactly which beliefs these refer to, to 
prove how widespread they are, to differentiate them from other beliefs, and to unpick them from other 
beliefs to which they are connected. They are difficult to falsify, some beliefs that scholars designate 
as myths may be true for some people128 which is both problematic and provocative, and some beliefs 
are held covertly.129 Considerable difficulties therefore exist in defining rape myths, and distinguishing 
between beliefs, stereotypes and attitudes. The word ‘myth’ may function in this context by signalling 
that particular attitudes are questionable, if not ethically wrong, but using the term ‘myth’ may be 
counter-productive because of the problems in proving that such attitudes are false. Further, if a belief’s 
status as myth depended on the number of people who held it, then if that number reduced it would no 
longer be definable as a myth, irrespective of its perceived problematic content.130 Including extent of 
acceptance within our understanding therefore, does not add to conceptual clarity and may even not 
be necessary, with scholars suggesting that ‘prevalence and consistency of rape myths…seem to be 
better treated as empirical problems, rather than matters of definition’.131 The force of rape myth 
arguments is therefore bound up with difficulties of language. What is more, Lonsway and Fitzgerald 
consider that rape myths are best conceptualised as stereotypes,132 and Conaghan and Russell suggest 
that the term rape supportive attitudes, is interchangeable with myths.133  
                                                 
127 Ibid 34. 
128 Gurnham D, (2015) ‘A Critique of Carceral Feminist Arguments on Rape Myths and Sexual Scripts’ (2016) 19 New 
Crim L Rev 141. 
129 Gerger et al (n 78); Or indeed might they be less so in 2019-20?  
130 Ibid. The belief might even become so widespread that it may be accepted as a norm. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Lonsway and Fitzgerald (n 78) 134. 
133 Conaghan and Russell (n 120) 43: ‘it is vital to situate a discussion of rape-supportive attitudes, or myths, within the 
broader historical context’. 
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Language and normativity  
It is I suggest Conaghan and Russell’s focus on or ‘turn to attitudes’134 which may be most helpful. To 
cut through the difficulties, RMS language is moving towards words such as ‘norms’ about behaviour 
and the suggestion that a key issue in understanding rape myths is not whether they are true or false, 
but whether they are ‘normatively infused’.135 How this necessary but troubling discussion of the RMS 
debate might help us in analysing child death cases is through appreciating that we need to be 
concerned with our approach to language and normativity and in order to move forward, should 
consider consolidating the language used. Significantly, Gerger et al. recognised that beliefs about 
women were ‘prescriptive in nature’,136 and it is this aspect that is central not only to the content of a 
modern rape myth as we now perceive it, but to the way in which we can define beliefs about mothers 
and the characterisation perhaps of a modern mothering myth.   
Gerger et al. finally proposed that ‘rape myths are descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about rape (i.e., 
about its causes, context, consequences, perpetrators, victims, and their interaction) that serve to deny, 
downplay or justify sexual violence that men commit against women’.137 By characterising rape myths 
in this way, the focus is on the consequences of the belief, which takes the heat out of all the 
problematical difficulties of whether the beliefs are true or false or widespread, etc.  What this may 
then mean for mothers accused of killing their children is that the language we use matters, and the 
difficulties faced by RMS are best avoided.  
If we wished to suggest that perhaps myths, expectations, assumptions, or even ideologies of 
mothering were implicated in contributing to wrongful convictions, then first we would need to define 
all the beliefs about mothering, determine their prevalence, and reveal their functionality, 
                                                 
134 Ibid 26. 
135 Ibid 39. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
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interconnectedness and whether they were held covertly. We would need to establish empirically that 
some beliefs are simply false and although that may be possible for particular beliefs about maternal 
behaviour, for example, that mothers should always stay at home and look after their children 
themselves until school age, they may be true for some people. What I suggest we can use in the 
meanwhile as a device to analyse child death cases is the definition of a rape myth as proposed by 
Gerger et al. applied to mothering, to produce the modern mothering myth. A proposed definition of a 
modern mothering stereotype or myth (MMM), is accordingly: a fixed belief about mothering or 
normative behaviour for mothers, which serves to support or justify adverse decisions about mothers 
within the criminal justice system.  
The following section considers maternal behaviours identified in child death cases,138 and tests the 
definition as a device, to assess whether it helps us analyse if maternal behaviours admitted as evidence 
may have been probative, or myths.  
 
Applying the Modern Mothering Myth 
Is alcohol abuse probative or a mothering myth? 
Drinking alcohol has long been regarded as harmful especially if carried out during pregnancy.139 
Health promotion programmes and research studies by public organisations such as the Royal College 
of Paediatricians and Child Health (RCPCH),140 have sought to publicise the dangers and disseminate 
normative understanding that maternal alcohol dependency harms children. Drinking excess alcohol 
in pregnancy may harm the unborn child, ‘resulting in “foetal alcohol syndrome”, (FAS) and “foetal 
alcohol effects (FAE)”’, characterised by growth retardation and central nervous system 
                                                 
138 Such as alcohol dependency, mental ill-health, attention seeking behaviour, emotional responses that appear unusual or 
excessive, omitting to resuscitate or call for help, or not using an apnoea alarm as instructed or expected. 
139 Cave (n 45) 5, and citing at n 13, Department of Health, Smoking Kills, A White Paper on Tobacco (Cmnd. 4177 
Department of Health 1998). 
140 Wolfe I, Macfarlane A, Donkin A, et al., Why Children Die: Death in Infants, Children and Young People in the UK 
Part A (A Report for the British Association for Child and Adolescent Public Health, RCPCH and National Children’s 
Bureau 2014). 
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impairment.141 The combination of alcohol and certain cardiac arrhythmias such as Long QT 
Syndrome (LQTS) may also be fatal in infants and adults because ‘alcohol abuse is associated with an 
increased incidence of cardiac arrhythmias’.142 Clark143 had an alcohol dependency for which she had 
received treatment prior to her pregnancies.144 However the facts of whether she drank in pregnancy 
or as a mother are not known, but were inferred by the prosecution. But for her previous dependency, 
there is little doubt that her defence could have argued that she was unquestionably a person of good 
character as evidenced by her health visitor,145 GP146 and nanny.147  
As reported in the first appeal against conviction, Clark’s health visitor had observed a close 
attachment to and bond between Clark and her first ‘responsive’ baby Christopher.148 Clark attended 
a mother and baby group ‘where she appeared as a normal, happy, caring mother’,149 her babies ‘were 
well cared for, loved by their parents and happy and content’150 and she was reported as a ‘loving, 
caring mother’.151 She is reported as welcoming visits from health visitors as part of the CONI 
programme,152 indicating she was a responsible mother of a next infant. Prior to the deaths of her 
children, health professionals praised her as exemplifying the ideal of the good mother, by her caring, 
nurturing and compliant behaviour.  
                                                 
141 Cave (n 45) 5, citing Jones KL, Smith DW, et al., ‘Patterns of Malformation in Offspring of Chronic Alcoholic Mothers’ 
(1973) 1(7815) Lancet 1267.  
142 Colling RT and Gallagher PJ, ‘The Pathology of Unexplained Cardiac Deaths’ in  Money-Kyrle R, Macleod S, and 
Money-Kyrle A, ‘SAD Cases in the Coroners’ Courts’ (Report of a Conference at The University of Oxford, The 
Foundation for Law, Justice and Society 10 January 2013) 9  and see Clark (No 2) (n 1). Long QT syndrome is a group of 
inherited cardiac arrhythmias that are diagnosed using an ECG, and are characterised by the abnormal duration and shape 
of the QT interval. Such defects, place the subject at risk of ventricular tachycardia and heart failure.   
143 Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 87(5) per Henry LJ. 
144 Batt J, Stolen Innocence (Ebury Press 2005) 131 written by a member of Clark’s defence team. 
145 Clark (No 1) (n 39) paras 34, 43, 65, 69 per Henry LJ. 
146 Ibid paras 35, 36. 
147 Ibid paras 43, 64, 69. 
148 Ibid para 34. 
149 Ibid para 17. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid para 43. 
152 Ibid; Cannings (n 1) para 74 per Judge LJ, referring to the work of the Foundation for the Study of Infant Deaths (FSID).  
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In contrast to Clark’s behaviour as a mother that satisfied normative expectations of mothering, counsel 
for the prosecution told the court that on the day of her second son Harry’s death, she ‘visited the off-
licence on two occasions to buy some wine saying (falsely, it would appear) that they were having a 
dinner party that evening’.153 The implications of such a fact may have raised concerns in jurors’ minds 
(although the CPS could not use the fact of Clark’s alcohol dependency in argument due to a pre-trial 
ruling) and beliefs in the wrongness of maternal alcohol dependency may have served to support if not 
justify a guilty verdict. Such views were amply reinforced by media portrayals following the trial when 
Harrison J reversed his pre-trial ruling. The BBC described Clark as a ‘35-year-old lawyer who drank 
through both her pregnancies… a lonely drunk… a depressed alcoholic’154  who had received hospital 
treatment for ‘bouts of severe binge drinking’,155 and she was even described by The Lawyer, as ‘driven 
by drink and despair, the solicitor who killed her babies’.156  
Clark’s alcohol dependency was suggested at trial, confirmed after conviction, and affirmed in her first 
appeal where it was reported that she ‘tended to drink more heavily when her husband was away’.157 
A belief on the part of both jurors and judiciary that a mother may have abused her child is 
understandable if she purchases alcohol covertly on the day her second son dies suddenly and 
unexpectedly and she has received treatment for alcohol dependency in the past. However, holding 
such a belief in a fixed way within criminal proceedings to support a finding of guilt is at least 
questionable. The judgment in her second (successful) appeal did not mention alcohol at all in 
acquitting Clark.158 Her dependence on alcohol and her possible consumption on the day her second 
                                                 
153 Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 87(5) per Henry LJ. 
154 ‘Baby killer was “lonely drunk”’, BBC News (London, 9 November 1999) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/512099.stm 
(accessed 9 April 2015). 
155 Ibid. 
156 The Editor, ‘Mother’s Ruin’, The Lawyer (2 February 2002) http://www.thelawyer.com/mother039s-
ruin/100860.article (accessed 22 October 2013). 
157 Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 87(5) per Henry LJ. 
158 Clark (No 2) (n 1). 
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child died, therefore did not justify either a belief or a decision that she was guilty of murder, nor her 
continued imprisonment.  
The reasons for using Clark’s alcohol dependency as part of legal argument in criminal proceedings, 
although understandable, may reasonably be expected to be linked with fixed views about the harm 
that alcohol may cause to children both in pregnancy and when caring for a small child. As Ann Oakley 
reflected, ‘of all the things women are supposed to be, mothers come first’.159 Helena Kennedy 
suggests that society expects women ‘to embody nurturance and protectiveness associated with 
mothering’,160 and consequently when women are accused of harming their child, Kennedy suggests 
there is a ‘heightened outrage’.161 Not only may such a mother be perceived as selfish, contravening 
expectations that she should forego self-centred behaviour in favour of altruism, such beliefs may 
induce prejudicial perceptions of the maternal behaviour.  
That alcohol dependency is not problematic for any person including mothers, is not my position. But, 
I wish to suggest that raising the fact of Clark’s past alcohol dependency at trial and at first appeal, 
without evidence of her having drunk excess alcohol immediately prior to the children’s deaths, risked 
providing the jury with a behavioural cue and engaging a fixed belief (a MMM), that justified the view 
that a mother with a previous alcohol dependency was guilty of murder.   
 
  
                                                 
159 Oakley A, Subject Women (Fontana 1981) 85. 
160 Kennedy H, Eve Was Framed: Women and British Justice (Vintage 1992) 25. 
161 Ibid. 
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Are emotional over-reactions probative or mothering myths?  
The consequences of trauma whether through physical violence162 or sexual assault163 can result in 
significant ‘emotional disorganisation’164 that may affect the behaviour of otherwise rational women. 
How such emotions including ‘fear, shock, disbelief, anger, self-blame and embarrassment’165 may be 
expressed varies according to the individual. But such expressions may diverge from expected norms, 
and be perceived as bizarre or unexpected and interpreted according to prescriptive beliefs such as 
rape myths166 for example, that have not allowed for the impact of trauma on behaviour.167 Similarly 
in child death cases, the appeal reports provide evidence of mothers’ behaviour on the days their 
children died, and the following discussion identifies that this behaviour may have been interpreted 
according to fixed beliefs about how traumatically bereaved mothers should behave, leading to adverse 
trial outcomes.  
Clark was on her own at home when she noticed that her son Christopher aged nearly three months 
was ‘a “dusty grey colour”168 and she knew something was wrong. She picked him up and dialled 
999’169 and asked for an ambulance. There is no mention of whether she tried to resuscitate the baby. 
When the ambulance arrived only two minutes later according to the appeal report170 the house was 
locked on the inside with Clark unable to find the keys. Paramedics entered the house after a 
‘neighbour arrived with the spare keys’,171 to find Clark holding the baby who was already ‘pale, 
                                                 
162 For example, Battered Women Syndrome (BWS).  Section 52(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 defines the 
defence of diminished responsibility as available where the defendant was suffering from an ‘abnormality of mental 
functioning’, which arose from a ‘recognised medical condition’, ‘substantially impaired D’s ability’ to understand the 
nature of her conduct, form a rational judgment, or exercise self-control, and ‘provides an explanation’ for D's ‘doing or 
being a party to the killing’. 
163 Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS); see Burgess AW and Holmstrom LL, Rape—Crisis and Recovery (Brady 1979) 35. 
164 Ellison L, ‘Closing the Credibility Gap: The Prosecutorial Use of Expert Witness Testimony in Sexual Assault Cases’ 
(2005) 9 Evid & Proof 239, 251. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Rumney PNS, ‘False Allegations of Rape’ [2006] Cambridge L J 128; Ellison L and Munro VE, ‘Reacting to Rape: 
Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant Credibility’ (2009) 49(2) Br J Criminol 202. 
167 Rumney, ibid 135-6, 141; Temkin J, ‘Reporting Rape in London: A Qualitative Study’ (1999) 38 How J Crim Just 17, 
23, 27; Temkin, J, ‘Plus Ça Change: Reporting Rape in the 1990s’ (1997) 37 Br J Criminol 507, 516. 
168 Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 36 per Henry LJ. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid para 18. 
171 Ibid para 37. 
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cyanosed, cold and quite rigid’.172 Clark’s behaviour is described at home, in the ambulance and at 
hospital; the ambulance driver stated Clark was ‘very distressed, crying and screaming’,173 she was 
‘on the verge of hysteria’174 and was so distressed the paramedic could not put the child on the 
resuscitator.175 On being told that Christopher was dead, Clark’s ‘reaction was described by a hospital 
doctor as very dramatic and hysterical’.176 Further, the doctor branded the behaviour as ‘atypical and 
the over-reaction made her feel quite uncomfortable’.177 In addition, a staff nurse stated that Clark had 
‘said that her husband would blame her and would not love her any more’.178 The evidence provided 
by professional witnesses suggests doubts that Clark’s grief was normal, indicating concern that Clark 
may have harmed Christopher.  
Misgivings may have further increased because of discrepancies between Clark’s accounts to 
ambulance personnel and doctors concerning Christopher’s whereabouts when he died.179 Clark stated 
that he was in a Moses basket to ambulance crews,180 but in a bouncy chair to paediatricians.181 When 
the police visited the home at 02.00 am on the night of the baby’s death they questioned the parents 
and removed both pieces of baby equipment,182 having already noted on the coroner’s form that 
Christopher had been found in a bouncy chair.183 Clark failed to later challenge that discrepancy, and 
the first appeal report states, ‘The fact that the appellant gave inconsistent accounts of where she found 
                                                 
172 Ibid para 18. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid para 19. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid para 20. 
182 Batt (n 144) 32. 
183 Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 20 per Henry LJ. 
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Christopher adds to its significance rather than detracting from it’,184 as she was unable to remember 
whether the child died in a bouncy chair or the Moses basket.185  
It is difficult to tell whether not remembering which place the child was in when discovered lifeless 
was probative, as the prosecution suggested or, whether Clark’s memory may have been impaired by 
the shock of Christopher’s death.  Ellison suggests that the impact of trauma in sexual assault cases 
may have a significant effect on memory. ‘Significantly, research suggests that the normal variability 
of memory can be exacerbated by the impact of trauma, such as that experienced by victims of sexual 
assault’.186 It is therefore possible that the risk that Clark may have suffered post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) as a result of the death of her child, resulting in impaired memory, may have been 
overlooked by both the defence and judicial summing up. Such a shocking moment of discovery is 
unlikely to be forgotten. But the view that detailed memories are accurate and can be recalled indicates 
that evidence of Clark’s faulty memory may have been interpreted in accordance with a fixed belief 
that all mothers should remember the factual circumstances of a child’s death. Any inconsistencies 
therefore would lead to support for an adverse conclusion.187  
Clark’s second child Harry also suddenly stopped breathing in the evening; she called the ambulance 
whilst her husband commenced resuscitation.188 Again the first appeal court judgment records 
professional witness evidence about Clark’s behaviour. Paramedics said when they arrived, Clark was 
‘running up and down the street outside the house, barefoot, in pyjamas and very distressed’;189 and 
                                                 
184 Ibid paras 89(1), 257. 
185 Ibid para 240. 
186 Ellison ‘Closing the Credibility Gap’ (n 164) 243 citing at n 28 Petrak J and Hedge B, The Trauma of Sexual Assault: 
Treatment, Prevention and Practice (Wiley 2002). 
187 Ellison, ibid citing at n 19 Brewer N, Potter R, Fisher R, et al., ‘Beliefs and Data on the Relationship Between 
Consistency and Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony’ (1999) 13 Appl Cognitive Psych 297, 310: ‘The influence of 
testimonial inconsistencies on juror judgments has, however, been specifically examined in several mock-juror studies. 
This research indicates that highlighting or eliciting inconsistencies in a witness's statements is likely to be an extremely 
effective means of discrediting the witness’. 
188 Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 3 per Henry LJ. 
189 Ibid para 44. 
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that she had behaved in a ‘“very dramatic and almost hysterical”’190 manner, described as ‘“such an 
over-reaction”’.191 To compound the concerns about Clark at the time of Harry’s death, she could not 
accurately recall to police in interviews at home the time that her husband had returned home on the 
night the second baby died, as she said she had confused the night the second child died with the night 
the first had died.192 In addition, a few days later the coroner193 said that Clark had stated ‘she and her 
husband would try for another baby’.194 Mrs Hurst said she felt that comment ‘most unusual’,195 and 
realised then that Clark had lost two babies. This observation led her to contact a senior police inspector 
and request a Home Office pathologist to conduct the post-mortem on the second baby Harry.196  
Clark’s behaviour and comments were therefore appraised by professionals and an adverse 
interpretation was made that her behaviour was not normal. Whether Clark’s comments support an 
adverse interpretation is uncertain. Newly bereaved mothers must surely behave as individuals and not 
according to preconceived essentialised normative understandings. Nevertheless, a coroner is likely to 
have witnessed many bereaved parents and possibly sufficient to form a view that Clark’s behaviour 
was aberrant.  But such interpretations about behaviour based upon experience are not the same I 
suggest, as objective large scale research studies on bereavement behaviour, which are notably lacking 
in this area.197   
The points identified in this section about Clark’s behaviour are taken from Henry LJ’s judgment 
dismissing her first appeal. Whereas Clark’s hysteria and distress is mentioned twenty times by Henry 
                                                 
190 Ibid para 258. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid paras 65, 66. 
193 Ibid paras 46, 67, 270. 
194 Ibid para 270. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid para 46. 
197 Brabin P, ‘Editorial: Understanding and Managing Grief after Perinatal Loss’ (2014) (4) Grief Matters 31; Wilson T, 
‘Perinatal Loss: Application of Loss and Grief Theories’ (2014) (4) Grief Matters 32; den Hartog ON, ‘Supporting Parents 
Following Perinatal Death’ (2104) (4) Grief Matters 58; Clark A, ‘Working with Grieving Adults’ (2004) 10 Advances in 
Psych Treatment 164. 
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LJ in his legal reasoning, in Kay LJ’s judgment of the second successful appeal,198 each word is 
mentioned only once. It is possible that Henry LJ was persuaded that Clark’s behaviour around the 
time of her sons’ deaths was so abnormal it supported if not justified upholding her conviction and 
dismissing her appeal. However, in the judgement of her second appeal such factors were barely 
mentioned. One cannot know the extent to which any member of the court may have believed that the 
evidence of Clark’s overwhelming distress, confusion and inappropriate comments justified a guilty 
verdict. But it is clear that in Kay LJ’s judgment, such factors were of no relevance or weight. 
Accordingly, there is a question whether professionals’ fixed beliefs about normal behaviour of 
mothers confronted with a dying child supported if not justified a guilty verdict, without expert 
evidence from a psychiatrist to support such perceptions, and there is also a question as to why defence 
counsel failed to adequately challenge what may have been mothering myths.    
How a mother should behave following the death of a child may be impossible to state without over- 
simplification. However as Judge LJ suggested in Cannings,199 if a fixed and over-simplified view is 
held that ‘lightning does not strike three times in the same place’200 then however a mother behaved, 
‘might be thought to confirm the conclusion that lightning could not indeed have struck three times’.201 
If the children’s deaths were natural then ‘virtually anything done by the mother on discovering such 
shattering and repeated disasters would be readily understandable as personal manifestations of 
profound natural shock and grief’.202 Judge LJ suggests that maternal behaviour in Cannings was 
therefore adversely interpreted within the context of and as a result of flawed expert evidence,203 and 
the same could be said of Clark.204 The judicial comments indicate that prejudicial interpretations of 
                                                 
198 Clark (No 2) (n 1) para 103 per Kay LJ. 
199 Cannings (n 1).  
200 Ibid para 11 per Judge LJ. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Meadow (n 42). 
204 Clark (No 1) (n 39) para 171 per Henry LJ citing Professor Meadow saying ‘You have to say two unlikely things have 
happened, and together it is very, very, very unlikely’. 
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maternal behaviour may be very persuasive, especially where expert evidence on the interpretation of 
pathology findings such as ‘petechial or pinpoint haemorrhages’,205 and ‘intra-retinal 
haemorrhaging’206 are complex and unfamiliar.  
In Cannings also there is little evidence that the normative interpretation of maternal behaviour was 
robustly challenged by her defence.207 The appeal judgment records that evidence of Cannings’ 
behaviour and emotional reactions when her young children experienced apparent or acute life 
threatening events (ALTE) was submitted in great detail,208 together with evidence of her use of the 
apnoea alarm,209 and who she called when she realised a child was in danger.210 
 
Failing to use an apnoea monitor: indicative of guilt or a mothering myth? 
Cannings was regarded by health professionals as a good mother and care-giver, with the appearance 
of an affectionate and caring mother.211 She had four children of whom three died. She was charged 
with the murder of two. All three suffered from what were referred to as acute or apparent life 
threatening events (ALTE) where they apparently stopped breathing, and the appeal transcript 
identified ALTEs as SIDS in which no death had actually resulted.212 Prosecution counsel argued that 
the ALTEs were the result of Cannings attempting to smother the children by obstructing their upper 
                                                 
205 Clark (No 2) (n 1) para 69 per Kay LJ. 
206 Ibid.  
207Cannings (n 1) para 14 per Judge LJ: ‘Mrs Cannings’s defence was simple: she had done nothing to harm any of her 
children. Although she was contending that the deaths were natural, notwithstanding specialist evidence called on her 
behalf at trial, she could not explain them, and she was not seeking to offer an explanation of her own. And, unusually, she 
was doing so in the very special context that medical specialists, both domestically and internationally, continue to 
acknowledge that the death of an infant or infants at home can simultaneously be natural and unexplained, even by them’. 
208 Ibid paras 51, 58, 65, 76, 102, 108, 112. 
209 Ibid paras 47, 52, 57, 58, 61, 63, 64, 76, 77, 78, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104,108, 109, 111, 112, 157. 
210 Ibid paras 40, 76-82, 93, 108-110. 
211 Ibid para 25. 
212 Ibid para 9. 
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airways,213 and the reasoning was supported by evidence that Cannings frequently forgot to use the 
apnoea monitor.214   
At the time when the mothers in this study were having their families, those with a new baby where 
there had been a previous sudden infant death (SID), were offered support from the Care of the Next 
Infant (CONI)215 programme managed by the University of Sheffield’s Child Health Unit.216 The 
worry for parents about how to care for a next infant was considerable, as Frances Rose, who was 
monitored as a baby explains:  
I know my parents went through the CONI scheme with me, ending up with a year or so of 
sleepless nights due to apnoea monitors (23 years ago these were less than accurate!), which 
gave them a certain amount of peace of mind, but was coupled with countless false alarms.217  
Apnoea is the term used when there is no respiratory effort for greater than 20 seconds or for a shorter 
period if accompanied by cyanosis218 or bradycardia,219 as in an acute life threatening event (ALTE).220 
Apnoea monitors are electronic devices activated by sensors attached to a baby’s chest or abdomen 
that respond to a baby’s respiratory movements and were provided for families to use when the baby 
was asleep or at night. Waite et al. found that most families (86%) used them.221 The monitor beeped 
with respirations and sounded a continuous alarm if the chest or abdomen stopped moving, indicating 
that respirations could not be detected. A variety of monitors were issued under the CONI programme 
                                                 
213 Ibid para 4. 
214 Ibid paras 77, 78, 157. 
215 Waite A, McKenzie A, Carpenter RG, et al., Report on 5000 Babies Using the CONI (Care of Next Infant) Programme 
(Foundation for the Study of Infant Deaths 1998). The CONI programme supported families in which there had been a 
previous SID, and followed up all subsequent siblings of a deceased infant.  
216 The Child Health Unit collated data from professionals and parents for publication in the CONI reports.  
217 Lullaby Trust, ‘I Never Thought I was A “Replacement” Child’ http://www.lullabytrust.org.uk/page.aspx?pid=1390  
(accessed 17 April 2014). 
218 A term given to a bluish colour of the skin and the mucous membranes of the lips and mouth, usually due to lack oxygen 
and an increase of unoxygenated haemoglobin or deoxyhaemoglobin in the blood stream.  
219 A term given to an abnormal slowing of the heartbeat. 
220 Acute Life Threatening Event (ALTE): when a baby stops breathing or its heart slows. 
221 Waite et al. (n 215) 11.  
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for home use,222 but they always had ‘serious drawbacks’223 because they were unable to ‘reliably 
detect life threatening events, their high rate of false alarms…failing to reliably detect when babies 
stop breathing’.224 Hence, as in Frances Rose’s example, apnoea monitors often sounded an alarm for 
no apparent reason, and confidence in monitors ‘gradually declined’225 as parents became more aware 
of the ‘limitations of the apnoea monitors’.226 As Judge LJ pointed out in Cannings, ‘it is not, as some 
think, a machine which prevents an infant death’.227 
Cannings was issued with a monitor,228 but her behaviour was argued by prosecution counsel to be 
anomalous because she often forgot to ensure that it was attached and working,229 and she reported 
being unable to remember whether she had heard the sound of the alarm when her babies had stopped 
breathing.230 She stated in evidence that ‘the police believed I had never used them [apnoea alarms] at 
all’,231 and that police had sound engineers test the alarms.232 Consequently, prosecution counsel 
argued that ‘the appellant had not told the full truth about the workings of the apnoea alarm’.233 
Evidence of her inconsistent memories, and emotional reactions was also presented in terms that 
suggested her behaviour, described as distressed, very shocked, sobbing, retching and vomiting,234 
may like Clark’s have been perceived as too much, and therefore indicative of guilt.235 
                                                 
222 Ibid. 
223 Burke MJ and Downes J, ‘A Fuzzy Logic Based Apnoea Monitor for SIDS Risk Infants’ (2006) 30(6) J Med Eng & 
Tech 397. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Waite et al. (n 215) 11: ‘from 84% confidence to 75%’. 
226 Ibid 19. 
227 Cannings (n 1) para 47 per Judge LJ.  
228 Ibid paras 47, 57, 63, 76. 
229 Ibid paras 47, 57, 63, 76, 77, 78, 157. Cannings frequently forgot to put the apnoea alarm on.  
230 Cannings A with Lloyd Davis M, Cherished: A Mother’s Fight to Prove her Innocence (Sphere 2007) 101. 
231 Ibid. 
232  Cannings (n 1) paras 111, 157 per Judge LJ. 
233  Ibid para 157, and alarms are also mentioned at paras 9, 47, 52, 57, 76, 77, 78, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105, 109, 111, 
154. 
234  Ibid paras 51, 58. 
235 There is an issue therefore in relation to interpretations of the feminine, that in some cases traumatic events lead to 
women behaving with too little emotion as in sexual assault cases, and in other cases with too much emotion as in these 
child death cases. There is a question whether there is any evidence as to the appropriate level of emotion to be shown in 
any given situation, if such behaviour is to be relied upon as evidence in criminal trials.  
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Whether the jury believed that the strength of Cannings’ emotional reactions and the fact that she did 
not attach the monitor and listen for it at all times supported a finding of guilt, is difficult to know for 
sure. However, the prominence given to such factors in the appeal judgment suggests that at trial, such 
considerations were significant. Hallett J directed the jury to ‘look at all the evidence’,236 and therefore 
maternal behaviour would have formed part of that appraisal, especially as there is no mention in the 
appeal report of a defence challenge to such evidence. In addition, although Clark and Cannings may 
be distinguished by Cannings having lost three babies and Clark having lost two, both were part of the 
CONI programme and issued with monitors, however Clark did not use the apnoea alarm at all during 
the day,237 and this fact was not raised in evidence. A belief might be held that in Cannings’ home 
where the young infants suffered repeated ALTEs, twenty-four hour monitoring should have been in 
place. However, monitors were known to be unreliable, infants were under continuous observation and 
monitor use as a decisive factor in criminal proceedings was inconsistent.  
In any event, it is possible that heuristics may have played a part in juror decision making.238 As 
Temkin and Krahé suggested in relation to rape trials, counterfactual thinking has been observed to 
occur when mock jurors are invited to re-imagine a situation such as a rape, and ask themselves what 
could have been done differently. In such circumstances, mock jurors are more likely to blame the 
person they have just imagined acting differently. If instead of a rape, the mock jurors were to imagine 
an ALTE and imagined what could or should have been done differently, then theoretically jurors 
might blame the mother for not making sure the child was attached to a working apnoea monitor. Of 
course that may be a very reasonable belief, but whether the belief supports or justifies a finding of 
murder given the known difficulties of monitoring instruments is a different matter. Nevertheless it is 
                                                 
236 Cannings (n 1) para 167 per Judge LJ. 
237 Clark (No 1) (n 39) paras 69, 47 per Henry LJ: because they had had ‘trouble with the CONI monitor giving false alarm’, 
‘They only used the monitor at night’. 
238 Temkin and Krahé (n 36) 49.   
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possible that failing to use an apnoea monitor may have been used by the jury as a key behavioural 
cue in attributing responsibility to the mother. 
As Judge LJ later suggested, it was possible that given the large number of experts called and the 
complexity of the evidence given, the jury may ‘inadvertently, unconsciously, have thought to itself 
that if, between them all, none could offer a definitive or specific explanation for these deaths, the 
Crown's case must be right’.239 Or, if evidence of maternal behaviour was interpreted using fixed 
beliefs combined with heuristics, a guilty verdict was supported and justified because the expert 
evidence was so inconclusive, thus presenting the possibility of a mothering myth.    
Not calling for an ambulance: probative of guilt or a mothering myth?  
When Cannings found her first baby Gemma ‘lying on her back, looking very, very white. She tried, 
unsuccessfully, to revive her. She called an ambulance’,240 but the baby could not be revived. The 
second baby Jason had an ALTE when the health visitor was present who resuscitated the child prior 
to his admission to hospital.241 Jason had a further ALTE at home a few days later, whereupon 
Cannings dialled 999 and the paramedics arrived.242 The baby died subsequently in hospital and, 
following a review of both deaths by leading paediatricians and neuropathologists, no cause of death 
was identified.243 The third baby Jade had an ALTE (whilst not connected to the apnoea alarm); 
Cannings called her GP who attended, and the child was taken to hospital244 and survived until 
adulthood.  
Following the fourth child Mathew’s birth, Cannings was taught ‘advanced resuscitation 
techniques’.245 When Mathew too suffered an ALTE in contrast to the three previous occasions, 
                                                 
239 Cannings (n 1) para 170 per Judge LJ. 
240 Ibid para 40. 
241 Ibid para 50-59. 
242 Ibid para 62. 
243 Ibid para 66-73. 
244 Ibid para 76-82, 93. 
245 Ibid para 96. 
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Cannings did not call 999, but called her husband to come home; no ambulance was called until after 
he rushed home from work.246 At the hospital when Mathew was confirmed to have died,247 Cannings’ 
husband ‘asked her in the presence of the staff nurse why she had called him before she had called an 
ambulance, as indeed she had. She was quiet for a few minutes, and then told her husband that she had 
panicked’.248 When interviewed by police on this question, she said she had wanted her husband to be 
present, that she wanted his help, ‘so that he could see Matthew and see what he was like’.249 The 
prosecution considered Cannings’ behaviour to be irregular, because although she had commenced 
resuscitation after ringing her husband, she ‘had not herself directly and immediately sought help either 
from the emergency services or indeed from neighbours, at least one of whom was a nurse who had 
offered to help’.250 In response, Cannings said of Mathew that she ‘“couldn't believe the way he was”. 
She wanted “Terry to be there to support me. I had always been on my own”’.251 It is difficult to 
understand how a mother may have felt in Cannings’ situation at the moment of discovering Mathew, 
faced with the prospect of losing a third child, and suspicion from her husband and family, and 
investigations by doctors and police. It is understandable that she did not want to be alone. But, it was 
‘Mathew’s death that triggered the investigation which culminated in her conviction’252 for the murder 
of both Jason and Mathew. The question whether Cannings’ behaviour in not calling the ambulance 
immediately in Mathew’s case was so prejudicially interpreted by the court at her trial, cannot be 
answered. However, within the framework of  expert evidence that ‘lightning does not strike three 
times in the same place’,253 then a fixed belief that Cannings should have called the ambulance 
                                                 
246 Ibid para 108-110. 
247 Ibid para 108. 
248 Ibid.  
249 Ibid para 108, 110. 
250 Ibid para 110. 
251 Ibid para 112. 
252 Ibid para 128.  
253 Ibid para 11. 
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immediately before commencing resuscitation and before calling her husband, may have supported 
and justified a finding of guilt.  
Nonetheless, if each child’s death is considered separately, Cannings behaved correctly throughout her 
challenging time as a mother, apart from the very last occasion, when she said she panicked and wanted 
her husband there. It is therefore also possible that the jury took her long tribulations into consideration 
and neither failure to use the apnoea alarm nor failure to call the ambulance were significant in a 
finding of guilt. But the jury needed to decide whether the child deaths were natural or unnatural,254 
and they heard expert evidence that three infant deaths in one family is very rare.255 In the absence of 
direct or indirect evidence,256 this opinion was key in determining that Cannings had a case to 
answer.257  
Judge LJ held that the ‘expert evidence was absolutely critical to these convictions’258 and that the 
fresh evidence regarding Long QT syndrome undermined the original expert evidence.259 Accordingly, 
it is possible that the jury came to a guilty verdict on the basis of a belief in the certitude of expert 
evidence (later considered to be unreliable in Patel,260) rather than because a fixed belief was held 
about maternal behaviour. If this is so, however, it is unclear why defence counsel were unable to 
convince the court of the reliability of expert evidence of Long QT syndrome presented at trial, unless 
other factors were more persuasive, such as adverse interpretations of maternal behaviour. The manner 
                                                 
254 Ibid paras 7, 157-9. 
255 Ibid paras 12, 44, 113, 114, 129, 137, 138, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 156, 159. 
256 Ibid para 14. 
257 Ibid para 163. 
258 Ibid paras 96, 116- 120, 175 regarding the likelihood of Long QT syndrome in the genetic makeup of the Cannings 
family, thus causing sudden deaths in her infants.  
259 Ibid para 175. 
260 Patel (n 25); and see Cannings (n 1) paras 15, 22, 164, 165, 171, with reference to Jack J’s acquittal of Patel. Judge LJ 
identified that the causes of the three children’s deaths in Patel were similarly to Cannings’ case very rare, but he considered 
Jack J’s reasoning with regard to the causes of death to be flawed.  
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in which carers behave at that critical moment of realising that a child needs help is mentioned in other 
cases too.261  
The last section to be examined here on evidence of behaviour relates to mental health, and whether 
evidence of behaviour can rightly indicate poor maternal mental health that then explains a child’s 
death. There are two areas of maternal mental health that are referred to in child death cases such as 
Cannings and Anthony.262 The first relates to the possibility of child killing whilst a mother’s mind 
was disturbed,263 and the second relates to child killing as a result of attention seeking behaviour such 
as MSbP.264 
 
Maternal mental ill-health: probative of guilt or a mothering myth?  
Cannings, was described as a ‘woman of good character’,265 who had no previous convictions,266 and 
was ‘a loving mother, apparently free of personality disorder or psychiatric condition’267 such as 
depression or post-partum psychosis, and who ‘consistently denied harming any of her children’.268 
Judge LJ explained in the appeal transcript that ‘Without medical evidence about the appellant’s 
mental state, a verdict of infanticide was not open to the jury’.269 Judge LJ’s comments indicate that 
at trial, the court was concerned that if the jury returned a verdict of murder, she should not receive a 
                                                 
261 Stacey (n 23); Gay and Gay (n 1); Al-Alas and Wray (n 25). These cases and the behavioural facts are examined in Orr 
(n 37). 
262 Cannings (n 1); Anthony (No 2) (n 1). 
263 Infanticide Act 1938  s (1): “Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child being a child 
under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of 
her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent 
upon the birth of the child, then, … she shall be guilty of … infanticide, and punished … (for) … manslaughter of the 
child’.  
264 See n 54; and see also: Meadow R, ABC of Child Abuse (BMJ Books, 1st ed, 1989); Meadow R, ‘Suffocation, Recurrent 
Apnoea and Sudden Infant Death’ (1990) 117(3) J Pediatrics 351; Meadow R, ‘Neurological and Developmental Variants 
of Munchhausen Syndrome by Proxy’ (1991) Dev Med & Child Neurol 270; Meadow R, ‘Unnatural Sudden Infant Death’ 
(1999) 80 Arch Dis Child 7. 
265 Cannings (n 1) para 4 per Judge LJ. 
266 Redmayne (n 18) 9. 
267 Cannings (n 1) para 4 per Judge LJ. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid para 5. 
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mandatory life sentence for homicide for each child, but should be sentenced for the offence of 
infanticide ‘a specific, lesser offence of homicide’.270 ‘Conviction for infanticide is usually followed 
by a noncustodial sentence’271 albeit often subject to a treatment or hospital order.272  
Cannings was criticised at trial for not calling the ambulance when Mathew was critically ill, for not 
calmly proceeding to resuscitate Jason or Jade herself, and for not using and being alert to the apnoea 
monitor at all times. The appeal transcript suggests however that Cannings was ‘faced with recurring 
disasters which made comprehensible any form of response which, on cold forensic analysis, would 
otherwise appear strange’.273 But the jury were told by the prosecution that she would not ‘have killed 
the children (as the jury found that she had) unless she was suffering from some form of personality 
disorder or psychiatric condition’.274  
It is therefore possible that a settled or fixed belief that Cannings’ behaviour was abnormal, together 
with a prescriptive belief that only a mental health diagnosis could account for the child deaths, 
justified a guilty verdict, notwithstanding that ‘there was no evidence to sustain any such diagnosis: 
indeed it was to the contrary’.275 Hallett J was moved to say after the guilty verdict was returned that, 
‘“I have no doubt that for a woman like you to have committed the terrible acts of suffocating your 
own babies there must have been something seriously wrong with you”’,276 which she considered was 
the only way to explain why Cannings could have murdered her children.277 The judge may have been 
trying to frame the case in order to allow for a compassionate legal response had an application for an 
infanticide defence been made. If made at trial, then the mandatory imposition of a life sentence that 
                                                 
270 Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? A Consultation Paper’ (Law Com No 177, Law 
Commission 2005) para 2.69. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Infanticide Act 1938; Law Commission, ibid para 1.115 and Chapter Nine; Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter 
and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, Law Commission 2006). 
273 Cannings (n 1) para 161 per Judge LJ. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid para 5. 
277 Ibid.  
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a murder conviction requires, may well have been averted or, had Cannings later admitted to killing 
her children, she may have been considered for an expedited appeal.278 A confession is however 
required for a defence of infanticide and mothers may be unable to admit to a killing at trial;279 they 
may be guilty, or have an undiagnosed psychiatric illness as suggested in Kai-Whitewind,280 or even 
be innocent. If a fixed belief exists that mothers such as Cannings should have said and done things 
differently, together with a belief that mental ill health may explain the behaviour, the killing and a 
denial of having caused harm, then such beliefs may have supported contested expert opinions, and 
justified a guilty verdict.  
Attention seeking behaviour: probative or a mothering myth?   
The prosecution also contended that Cannings had smothered one of her sons ‘in an attempt to evoke 
sympathy’,281 suggesting the ‘need to draw attention to herself, a manifestation of factitious disorder 
by proxy, a condition which, in her case, was excluded’.282 The appeal court ‘had difficulty following 
this suggestion’,283 and it is unclear why it was made, unless to damagingly associate Cannings with a 
destructive diagnosis of MSbP.284 In Anthony285 however, evidence of an MSbP diagnosis was put 
forward for admission, but excluded following defence submissions arguing that Professor Meadow’s 
diagnosis ‘amounted to no more than evidence of propensity’.286 Evidence of ‘behavioural tendency 
or propensity’,287 indicates that a defendant is more likely to behave in a particular way than another,288 
but propensity cannot describe what really happened,289 only what the defendant may have done.  
                                                 
278 Law Commission No 304 (n 272) para 8.4. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Kai-Whitewind (n 24).  
281 Cannings (n 1) para 59 per Judge LJ. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Otherwise known as Fabricated (or Factitious) Induced Illness by Carers (FIIC) See RCPCH, Fabricated or Induced 
Illness by Carers, Report of the Working Party (RCPCH 2009). 
285 Anthony (No 2) (n 1) para 2, pp 2, 3, 8 per Judge LJ. 
286 R v Donna Anthony (Appeal against Conviction) (No 1) [2000] WL 989311 p 2 per Tuckey J. 
287 Redmayne  (n 18) 6. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
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Anthony had two children, Jordan who died aged almost a year, and Dean who died aged just over 
four months. Anthony denied harming either child and submitted that both deaths were natural.290 
Post-mortem findings on Jordan showed no evidence that the death was unnatural, nor any indication 
that the death was natural either,291 and the cause of death was concluded as unascertained or SUDI. 
In Michael’s case although features of SID were also identified, the pathologist stated that ‘the 
possibility of one mother having two unexplained deaths, in other words lightening striking twice, was 
most unlikely and outside his experience’.292 He therefore concluded that the babies had both been 
suffocated.293  
Professor Meadow who had also given (flawed) evidence in both the Clark and Cannings294 cases, 
reviewed the post-mortem findings in Anthony, concluding that the deaths were typical of smothering 
because of the ‘“incredibly long odds” against two children in the same family dying of natural 
unexplained causes.’295 Natural cot death he said happened every 1 in 1000 births, therefore he 
suggested, the ‘“chance of a natural cot death occurring twice in the same family is 1 in 1000 x 1 in 
1000 which is 1 in 1,000,000. It is extraordinarily unlikely…”’.296 As a result of this conclusion, 
Anthony was alleged to have killed the children ‘to bring attention to herself’,297 in line with MSbP,298 
although no expert opinion on MSbP was permitted. Anthony was sentenced to life imprisonment.  
Her first appeal in 2000 was refused; at that appeal she sought to exclude expert witness Meadow’s 
opinions, because he had been of the view (although it was not admitted in court), that she suffered 
                                                 
290 Anthony (No 2) (n 1) para 2 per Judge LJ. 
291 Ibid para 55. 
292 Ibid para 59. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Clark (No 2) (n 1); Cannings (n 1). 
295 Anthony (No 2) (n 1) para 69 per Judge LJ. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibid para 4.  
298 Meadow R, ‘False Allegations of Abuse and Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy’ (1985) 60(4) Arch Dis Child 385; 
Meadow R, ‘Management of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy’ (1984) 26(5) Dev Med & Child Neurol 672.  
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MSbP, and therefore his opinions submitted in court would have been prejudiced by that view.299 In 
addition, Anthony’s defence sought to argue that she was suffering from a severe personality disorder 
at the time of the children’s deaths and that she should have access to the defence of diminished 
responsibility.300 Both grounds for appeal were rejected, but five years later, following referral to the 
CCRC301 a second appeal accepted that as in Cannings,302 ‘the occurrence of a second unexpected 
infant death within a family is not a rare event and is usually from natural causes’.303 Meadow’s 
evidence on statistical probabilities was acknowledged to have been flawed.304 The Appeal court drew 
on fresh evidence305 in Anthony to conclude that if the case were to have proceeded at the time of the 
second appeal then ‘the medical evidence for the Crown would have appeared less compelling than it 
must have seemed at trial’.306  
It is therefore difficult to know the extent to which Anthony’s alleged attention seeking behaviour 
influenced either the trial or the first appeal outcomes. However, given the presence of the leading 
proponent of MSbP at trial, even though he could not give evidence of MSbP, considerations of mental 
health may have been significant in both judicial and juror considerations. Beliefs in the actuality of 
difficult and unlikeable parents,307 fictitious illness,308 and mothers who kill their children,309 may 
have been encouraged by Meadow’s discourses at JSB seminars,310  his publication record,311 and his 
                                                 
299 Anthony (No 2) (n 1) para 4 per Judge LJ. 
300 Ibid  
301 CCRC Referral No 715/03 available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/criminal-cases-review-commission/case-
library/2 (accessed 18 December 2013).  
302 Cannings (n 1). 
303 Ibid para 141 per Judge LJ, cited in Anthony (No 2) (n 1) para 78 per Judge LJ. 
304 Anthony (No 2) (n 1) para 92 per Judge LJ. 
305 Carpenter RG, et al., ‘Repeat Sudden Unexpected and Unexplained Infant Deaths: Natural or Unnatural?’(2005) 365 
Lancet 29; Waite et al., (n 215); Weindling AM, ‘The Confidential Enquiry into Maternal and Child Health (CEMACH)’ 
(2008) 88 Arch Dis Child 1034; Fleming et al. (n 41). 
306 Anthony (No 2) (n 1) para 96 per Judge LJ.  
307 Meadow R, ‘Difficult and Unlikeable Parents’ (1992) 67(6) Arch Dis Child 697.  
308 Meadow R, ‘Fictitious Epilepsy’ (1984) 2(8393) Lancet 25. 
309 Meadow R, ‘Mothering to Death’ (1999) 80(4) Arch Dis Child 359. 
310 Baird V, HC Deb 24 Feb 2004, vol 418, Col 39 WH. 
311 Meadow R, ‘Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy’ (1980) 55 Arch Dis Child 731; Meadow ABC of Child Abuse (n 264); 
Meadow ‘Suffocating’ (n 264); Meadow ‘Neurological and Developmental Variants’ (n 264); Meadow ‘Unnatural Sudden 
Infant Death’ (n 264)  
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argument that if no medical reason could be established for a SID then MSbP should be considered. 
The RCPCH has published guidance on the diagnosis of FIIC312 or FIIP (by Proxy), as the syndrome 
has been variously referred to in the UK, and it remains controversial in both English313 and Australian 
courts.314 It is not appropriate either to dismiss the existence of behaviour that amounts to FIIC, or to 
suggest that the Crown were wholly wrong to raise the possibility of MSbP in both Cannings and 
Anthony.  The issue that arises however, is whether a fixed belief is held by agents of the court that 
where there is no conclusive pathology, nor irrefutable evidence of mental ill health, but there are 
indications that may be interpreted as attention seeking behaviour, that a mother must be guilty of 
abuse or murder.   
 
Conclusion: Does behaviour matter?  
Judging character plays a ‘central role’315 in our ordinary everyday decision making but, within the 
criminal trial reliance on ‘character becomes more controversial’,316 particularly as character as 
indicated by ‘past behaviour and behavioural tendencies’317 may be introduced at trial as a way of 
impugning the credibility of a defendant or witness.318 Personal background information however, 
together with conduct and character evidence has long been admitted in criminal trials,319 in order that 
the courts have an opportunity of hearing from defence character witnesses about the nature of the 
accused, and whether the allegation was “out of character”.320  
                                                 
312 RCPCH (n 284). 
313 A County Council v A Mother and A Father and X, Y, Z (Children) (CC v XYZ) [2005] EWHC 31 (Fam), [2005] WL 
353381; X County Borough Council v ZS, DJW, KJW (the Child) by his Guardian v GEM, CM (GEM and others) [2015] 
WL 10382713. 
314 R v LM  [2004] QCA 192.  
315 Redmayne (n 18) 1. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid 6. 
318 Ibid 5. 
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The reason for the admission of character evidence is that it indicates dispositions which persist over 
time, and aids interpretations of behaviour around the time of a criminal event based on past 
behaviours.321 But, behaviour as character could also be used to denote a person’s ‘bad character, 
previous convictions, disposition, or reputation’322 and such evidence has been considered 
inadmissible at common law; bad character evidence was considered prejudicial to a defendant because 
it ‘encouraged mistaken inferences and faulty fact finding’323 and demonstrated  merely propensity.324  
The Court of Appeal has voiced its concerns relating to the inclusion at common law of material that 
demonstrates propensity or reduces credibility because such background evidence may be used as a 
vehicle for smuggling in otherwise inadmissible evidence.325 This is important, because the difference 
between how the legal system considers evidence should be interpreted,326 and how evidence is 
interpreted by the public,327 is an area that ‘we know little about’.328   If the legal profession and the 
judiciary have concerns about the role of background evidence and its permissive admission, the use 
of warning devices such as the modern rape myth and the modern mothering myth become 
indispensable in highlighting and preventing possible injustices.   
                                                 
321 Redmayne (n 18) 3. 
322 Roberts and Zuckerman (n 61) 582. 
323 Ibid 587. 
324 Lacey N, ‘The Resurgence of Character: Responsibility in the Context of Criminalization’ in Duff A and Green S (eds) 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (OUP 2011) 166. 
325 For example, R v Campbell [2007] EWCA Crim 1472, [2007] 1 WLR 2798 in which previous convictions for ABH 
were adduced as evidence that the defendant had a propensity to commit ABH. Lord Phillips LCJ criticised the admission 
of this evidence, suggesting that bad character evidence used to demonstrate propensity was of lesser probative value than 
evidence of actual conduct. See also R v Dolan [2003] EWCA Crim 1859 paras 21, 27 per Tuckey LJ citing Professor 
Birch: the ‘evidence was obviously more prejudicial than probative’ and not relevant. Further, ‘it went to propensity’. 
326 Redmayne (n 18) 87. 
327 See the way in which the public within mock juror trials interpret behaviour evidence and the way in which women may 
judge other women using their own behavioural norms in Ellison and Munro (n 166); Ellison L, ‘Turning Mirrors into 
Windows? Assessing the Impact of (Mock) Juror Education in Rape’ (2009) 49(3) Br J Criminol 363; Ellison L, ‘A Stranger 
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Mock Jury Study’ (2010) 13(4) New Crim L Rev 781; Ellison L, ‘Better the Devil you Know? “Real Rape” Stereotypes 
and the Relevance of a Previous Relationship’ (2013) 17(4) Intl J Evid & Proof 299; Ellison L, ‘Telling Tales: Exploring 
Narratives of Life and Law within the (Mock) Jury Room’ (2015) 35(2) Leg Studs 201. 
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That background evidence may be used in criminal trials is not novel, but we should be cautious about 
using non-criminal behaviour evidence because as Redmayne signals, the trial may then become an 
examination of the ‘defendant’s life and attitudes’329 with the possibility that for all of us, and 
especially mothers accused of killing their children, ‘the state might dredge up any unpleasant 
behaviour in our lives and use it to convict us’,330 or of course in rape trials perhaps, to wrongly acquit 
the defendant.  
RMS tells us clearly that female behaviour and its interpretations matter. It also suggests that further 
research is needed into understanding where there is meaning, relevance or even probative value in 
particular female behaviours if they are to be used as evidence, and into the ways in which the public 
interpret behaviour evidence. RMS has had success in challenging the permissive admission of 
evidence of complainant behaviour in rape trials and by using the device of a rape myth has sought to 
isolate, define and measure the prevalence of beliefs which may be used in criminal trials to show 
propensity and/or bad character. In so doing, RMS has uncovered multiple layers of complexity 
comprising beliefs, attitudes and norms relating to women, with varying functionalities and 
interconnections.  
The same complexities may be true also of beliefs about mothers and their behaviours when they are 
accused of killing their children. By being more aware of the pitfalls of language, and the firmer ground 
of normativity we may be able to identify the operation of prescriptive beliefs in child death cases. The 
modern Mothering Myth may provide us with a device with which to challenge the admissibility of 
evidence of a mother’s conduct and behaviour prior to and around the time that a child dies. It is 
essential for justice that we distinguish between beliefs going only to propensity and actual conduct 
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relating to criminal liability when mothers are accused of killing their children. We can and should 
challenge modern mothering myths.    
 
